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INTRODUCTION 
Maxine Eichner† & Clare Huntington‡ 
 
Half a century after the beginning of the second wave, feminist legal theorists are still 
writing about many of the subjects they addressed early in the second wave: money, sex, 
reproduction, and jobs. What has changed is the way that they talk about these subjects. 
Specifically, these theorists now posit a more complex and nuanced conception of power. And as 
conceptions of power have changed, so have conceptions of the role of law in achieving sex 
equality. 
 
When feminist legal theory first began to pick up steam in the 1970s and 1980s, the 
reigning account of power put forth by the liberal feminists who dominated that era was fairly 
straightforward. These feminists borrowed from a widely held view of power at the time, in 
which power was conceived largely as a restrictive force, which operated on women externally 
to restrict them from doing what they would otherwise choose (Williams, 1982; Taub & 
Schneider, 1998). These theorists paid little attention to the way in which power affected 
women’s interior wants and desires. Liberal feminists were thus drawing on a classic conception 
of power. As articulated by Max Weber: “we understand by ‘power’ the chance of a man or a 
number of men to realize their own will in a social action even against the resistance of others 
who are participating in the action” (1968, p. 926).  Applying this idea, feminist legal theorists 
conceptualized sex inequality as a problem largely produced through women’s unequal treatment 
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by the law. Women’s best shot at equality, in this view, was to eradicate these legal barriers, 
often by exposing and challenging the underlying gender stereotypes (Ginsburg, 2000; Taub & 
Williams, 1985; Taub & Schneider, 1998). These feminists therefore called for sex-blind 
decisions in the workplace, having women serve on juries, and so forth. 
 
This liberal account of the role of power in women’s inequality was soundly contested at 
the end of the 1980s by what came to be called “dominance feminism.” This position, developed 
most forcefully by Catharine MacKinnon, challenged the notion that power acts only externally 
on women. In the dominance model, male power is seen as univocal and completely totalizing, 
creating the world, including women’s sexuality, according to its will. This power constructs the 
wants, needs, and even the very identities of the women in its ambit. According to MacKinnon, 
“in feminist terms, the fact that male power has power means that the interests of male sexuality 
construct what sexuality as such means, including the standard way it is allowed to be felt and 
expressed and experienced, in a way that determines women’s biographies, including sexual 
ones” (MacKinnon, 1989, p. 129). Despite this very different conception of power, dominance 
feminism, too, turned to the law for remedies. What dominance feminists called for, though, was 
not the equal treatment of the law sought by liberal feminists. Instead, they largely sought to 
restrict men imposing their will on women. These feminists thus advocated for the prohibition of 
pornography because of its link to violence against women and sexual harassment laws that 
reined in men’s behavior in the workplace. Dominance feminists did not posit a theory of agency 
for women, largely because agency was inconceivable under this totalizing theory of power. 
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The dominance model made considerable gains for feminist theory by responding to 
serious deficiencies in earlier feminists’ view of power. In holding that power operated 
externally on individuals, those earlier feminists had failed to consider the way that power can 
shape women’s identity, aims, and desires. Their accounts therefore allowed opponents of 
feminism to argue that women’s differences from men justified their unequal treatment. The 
dominance model of power effectively countered these arguments. In a critical step forward for 
feminist legal theory, gender hierarchy could no longer be justified by women’s differences or 
desires because, in Susan Bordo’s words, “female obedience to the dictates of [dominant gender 
norms] is better conceptualized as bondage than choice” (Bordo, 1993, p. 22). Additionally, with 
their myopic focus on equal treatment under the law, earlier feminists did not recognize the ways 
that formal equality would not fully address their concerns. By contrast, the dominance model of 
power highlighted the limitations of equal treatment and posited a more skeptical view of law’s 
ability to liberate. 
 
With this said, the dominance model also had considerable flaws when it came to 
analyzing sex inequality. As a number of feminist legal theorists pointed out, it conceptualized 
all women as oppressed in the same totalizing manner, without regard to differences in sexual 
orientation, race, class, and a host of other factors. (Crenshaw, 1991; Mahoney, 1993) As we 
now well appreciate, gender is only one of a number of cross-cutting axes of power, but the 
dominance model lacked the tools to think through the complexity of these axes. 
 
Furthermore, the dominance view of power was so totalizing that it could not 
conceptualize resistance to dominant norms. If women are truly the passive victims MacKinnon 
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theorized, they could never depart from such norms. Dominance theory, thus, could not identify 
the conditions that would foster or retard resistance. In MacKinnon’s world, everything is 
relentlessly bleak, and even partial escape from the negative forces of power becomes 
impossible. This monolithic view of power caused MacKinnon to miss the myriad ways in which 
women, in actual fact, fail to comport with conceptions of identity grounded in gender hierarchy.  
 
The dominance model also overstated men’s power, even while it ignored women’s. 
MacKinnon’s account ignored the way in which men are themselves constructed within the 
system of gender hierarchy rather than its conscious creators for their own interests. It also elided 
the differences among men, erasing the power differential that accompanies race, class, sexual 
orientation and other salient factors. By the same token, this theory could not conceptualize the 
extent to which men resist unequal norms of sexual citizenship or the conditions that would 
promote this resistance. 
 
Finally, the dominance account of power could not adequately conceptualize the 
complexity of contemporary gender norms. While MacKinnon posited particular, totalizing 
norms that governed women’s lives, the force of many such norms has diminished over time. As 
Nancy Fraser states, “we live in a time of intense contestation concerning gender, sexuality, and 
sexual difference. Far from being monolithically patriarchal, the interpretation of these terms is 
at every point subject to dispute” (Fraser, 1997, p. 234). The dominance view gave no assistance 
in analyzing the complexity of these forces.  
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While liberal feminism was shifting toward dominance feminism, poststructuralists, most 
prominently Michel Foucault, were making significant contributions to the conceptualization of 
power. For Foucault, power in modern society operates primarily as a productive force that 
shapes all humans by molding their desires and self-concepts. As such, power operates in 
everyday interactions, where it “reaches into the very grain of individuals, touches their bodies 
and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning processes and 
everyday lives” (Foucault & Gordon, 1980, p. 39). Some feminist theorists such as Judith Butler 
fruitfully used the Foucauldian conception of power (Butler, 1990), but Foucault himself did not 
develop a robust account of power and gender inequality.  
 
Similarly, Foucault did not develop an adequate account of agency or resistance to 
dominant norms. His early work left little room for subjectivity, socially constructed or not. In 
this early work, when subjects exercise power, they do so to accomplish power’s intentions, 
rather than their own (Foucault, 1970).  Foucault’s later work theorized a subject capable of 
resistance and subjectivity; in this later construction, subjects could resist precisely because they 
were positioned within power relations. According to this later Foucault, the very fact that 
subjects are constituted within a field of power relations positions them to exercise some 
subjectivity in how they enact their roles (Foucault & Gordon, 1980). Yet this later Foucault 
never adequately considered the complex ways in which identity, agency, and choice are related 
to power and inequality, nor the conditions under which agency can be increased and inequality 
reduced.  
 
This brief review of some trends in feminist thought necessarily elides numerous nuances 
and strains, but it highlights the contribution of more recent scholarship that recognizes the 
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complexities of power in contemporary society, the ways in which these complexities entrench 
sex inequality, and the role that law can play in reducing inequality and increasing agency. The 
feminist legal theorists in this volume are emblematic of this effort. They carefully examine the 
relationship between gender, equality, and power across an array of realms – sex, reproduction, 
pleasure, work, money. In doing so, they identify social, political, economic, developmental, and 
psychological and somatic forces, operating both internally and externally, that complicate the 
expression and constraint of power. Finally, they give sophisticated thought to the possibilities 
for legal interventions in light of these more complex notions of power. 
   
Consider the article Going Wild: Law and Literature and Sex, by Susan Appleton and 
Susan Stiritz, a law professor and a social work lecturer on sexuality, respectively. This article 
describes a seminar they co-teach to law students and other graduate students about literature, 
sex-positivism, and the legal regulation of sexuality. As they construct it, sexuality is neither part 
of some pre-discursive, natural realm whose expression brings liberation, nor is it both cause and 
effect of women’s inequality. Instead it is a complex realm shaped by power, interwoven with 
narrative, and offering possibilities for both pleasure and peril. Within this realm, the authors 
seek to make more space for subjectivity and more room for pleasure through inviting their 
students and readers to explore the “wild zone,” an area where those at the margins of society 
conceptualize experiences unrecognized by the dominant culture (Ardener, 1975; Showalter, 
1981). Through literary texts, Appleton and Stiritz help students and readers recognize, for 
example, the many ways the law privileges penile-vaginal penetration and fails to acknowledge 
the clitoris as a critical source of women’s pleasure. The authors use this study of marginalized 
experiences to attune students and readers to the broader dynamics of social injustice and to 
possibilities for change. Consistent with the complicated relationship between power, sexuality, 
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law, and broader social forces, especially class dynamics, Appleton and Stiritz do not tell a 
unidirectional story of oppression and reclamation. Instead, the authors acknowledge the limits 
of sex-positivism in a deeply patriarchal society, while affirming usually unrecognized 
opportunities for improvement. They also locate their own ambivalence and uncertainty about 
how to address the intersection of sex positivism and their students’ experiences of sexual 
violence. 
 
Continuing the theme of sexual agency, Katharine Baker and Michelle Oberman, in their 
article Women’s Sexual Agency and the Law of Rape in the 21st Century, explore many of the 
issues identified by Appleton and Stiritz, most notably agency and the boundary between sexual 
violence and sexual pleasure. Baker and Oberman analyze the non-consent baseline in rape law 
in light of the rich body of sex-positive literature that has arisen since this law’s instantiation. 
They ask how these sex-positive narratives, which portray women as having significant sexual 
agency, map onto young women’s experience of sex. To answer this question, they draw on 
empirical work documenting the subjective experiences of young women’s sexual encounters. 
They find that although many of these experiences could be classified as rape, the young women, 
invoking their belief in their own sexual agency, do not perceive the encounters as sexual 
violence. Baker and Oberman observe that these readily available narratives of sexual agency 
lead women to perceive themselves as sexual agents, but in practice they rarely exercise that 
agency during sexual encounters. Thus, the dominance feminist account of sex as something that 
is routinely done to women remains fairly accurate. What is new and challenging for the law is 
the growing body of research suggesting that women’s embrace of their own agency leads them 
to reject the characterization of nonconsensual sex as rape, even as they continue to act according 
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to persistently gendered scripts. The relationship between gender, identity, and power, the Baker 
and Oberman analysis demonstrates, is far more complex, and the recuperative tendencies of 
power significantly stronger, than much sex-positive literature would suggest. 
 
If these four authors explore the complexities of power with respect to sexuality, Angela 
Harris does so with respect to the relationship between gender and therapy culture in her article 
Care and Danger: Feminism and Therapy Culture. As Harris explains, the difference feminism 
of the 1980s and 1990s (Gilligan, 1982; West, 1990) has found a contemporary expression in the 
therapy culture that permeates multiple institutions. Under the banner of emotional literacy, both 
men and women from the board room to the court room embrace the values associated with 
difference feminism—caring, emotional attunement, empathy, and so on. Harris finds much that 
is positive in this move, noting that therapy culture helps dismantle the gender binary of public 
man and private woman and that it does so without essentializing women. Harris also notes that 
an appreciation of interdependency facilitates a reconceptualization of liberal theory to 
accommodate caregiving and human dependency. And yet Harris recognizes the tendencies of 
postmodern power to coopt counternarratives in ways that entrench existing inequalities. Harris 
demonstrates, for example, that therapy culture can be understood as a deeply political effort to 
deepen the privatization of dependency and risk, with market and state failings recast as personal 
failings. This de-politicization affects both the construction of problems and the framing of 
solutions, leading decision-makers to place individualism at the center. Workers may feel 
connected with one another, but they do so in an increasingly brutal workplace that undermines 
families and fails to recognize broader causes of inequality. Therapy culture’s response to these 
deeper issues is to help workers develop empathy, not restructure the workplace. For Harris, 
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then, therapy culture while potentially resistant to dominant gender narratives, ultimately has the 
possibility of reinforcing inequality. 
 
In Market-Cautious Feminism, Maxine Eichner explores the intersections among power, 
capitalism, and gender in critiquing U.S. feminism’s celebration of women’s entry into the paid 
workplace. Absent significant regulation of free-market forces, she contends, women’s 
participation in the paid workplace cannot achieve sex equality. Further, Eichner argues, 
feminists who wax victorious over women’s increased workforce participation fail to appreciate 
the complex ways in which capitalism constrains women’s lives. She explores the interaction 
between the material and discursive forces of capitalism, in which long hours in the workplace 
become obligatory not simply through financial need, but also because insecurity and inequality 
create a culture focused on work and obsessed with success and its material trappings. 
Ultimately, she calls for legal reform, not just to regulate the market in ways that expand 
women’s and men’s agency, but also to increase the availability of counternarratives to the 
current pro-work messages loudly sounded in U.S. culture.   
 
Naomi Cahn and June Carbone continue the exploration of the complexities of 
postmodern power in their article Unequal Terms: Gender, Power and the Recreation of 
Hierarchy. The authors argue that despite feminism’s commitment to identifying and 
deconstructing power, feminism has been slow to respond to the growing inequality in America. 
Cahn and Carbone contend that the valorization of attributes traditionally associated with men—
competition, hierarchy, and individualism—benefits elite men, who increasingly control both 
capital and political influence. But women, non-elite men, families, and vulnerable populations 
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bear the costs. Cahn and Carbone call for increased feminist engagement with the structural 
aspects and gendered effects of inequality. The authors thus challenge the construction of power 
as male over female. Instead, they demonstrate the many ways men and traditionally male 
characteristics benefit a small segment of men, at the expense of other men and most women. 
 
Finally, showing feminism’s wide net, Jennifer Hendricks explores philosophical and 
legal questions about the regulation of reproductive decisions in her article Schrödinger’s Child: 
Non-Identity and Probabilities in Reproductive Decision-Making. Hendricks engages with Derek 
Parfit’s “non-identity” argument that state action regulating reproductive decisions cannot be 
justified by reference to the best interests of the resulting children because the regulation itself 
will affect which children are born, and therefore there is no particular child who will be 
benefitted (Parfit, 1984).  Hendricks first explores the dangers of this line of thought, 
demonstrating that the non-identity argument can be used to limit women’s autonomy rather than 
the state’s reach into reproductive decision-making. Hendricks then offers potential solutions to 
the problem, drawing on the work of Melinda Roberts, who argues that legal regulation can be 
justified by expanding the time frame so that the chance any particular child is born is highly 
speculative and thus decisions are made for any child that may be born. (Roberts, 2007) 
 
Together, these articles engage with power as a multi-faceted phenomenon. The authors 
identify both the internal conditions needed for agency as well as the external conditions needed 
for freedom. Sexual agency, for example, is not simply about a felt experience. Rather, it 
requires a broader societal context in which young women have multiple opportunities for 
development and self-expression. For those at the margins—those in the wild zone identified by 
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Appleton and Stiritz—sexual agency comes from both the formulation of experience and the 
introduction of that experience to the broader society. Similarly, women’s non-materialist 
fulfillment requires both the internal and external space for reflection. In short, these articles 
embrace and reflect the best of what feminism has to offer, as a pedagogy, history, analytical 
tool, and vision.  
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